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Abstract. Wireless technology provides an unprecedented level of design flexibility for new 
system designs and legacy system updates. However, there are several challenges which present 
themselves when adopting wireless technologies for use in safety systems.  This paper elaborates 
on available design techniques which can resolve the implementation issues for a given 
application, to ensure data communication between nodes is safe (deterministic), secure, reliable 
and available.   
1. Introduction 
Product and service complexity is increasing along with additional demands on leaner engineering 
practices in order to reduce development time and manufacturing costs.  Product design flexibility is 
essential to enable new features and help manage customer requirements.  The implementation of new 
technologies in order to improve system capabilities so that product solutions continue to meet the ever 
increasing demands of the customer is paramount.  Among other control system related technologies, 
wireless technology is considered as a key enabler in meeting growing customer requirements and 
expectations.  In recent years, wireless technology has gained acceptance within industry based on the 
wide scale adoption through commercial product developments, in particular the telecommunications 
sector from which many other industrial sectors benefit [1].  The wireless sensor network market was 
valued at $29 Billion in 2016, and is predicted to be worth $94 Billion by 2023 [2, 3].  Industrial control 
systems form a large share of this market. 
 Significant benefits through the introduction of wireless technologies and wireless sensor 
networks may include [4,5,6]:  System simplification through the reduction in cables and connectors, 
system cost reduction, system size and mass reduction, reduced maintenance burden associated with the 
inspection and testing of cables, reduction in connector pin failures, improved system resilience to 
hazards through communication diversity, invulnerability to wider system hazards such as fire and force 
impact, providing galvanic isolation between equipment, minimising impact on extant infrastructure 
when incorporating additional functionality, and increasing system design flexibility.  Additionally, 
wireless technology reinforces the ‘Industry 4.0’ and ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT) movement, and enables 
the possibility for fully autonomous unmanned systems and platforms. 
 
2. Wireless Technology Examples 
There are several different methods of wireless communication, including: electromagnetic waves (e.g. 
radio, microwave frequency or free-space optical) and acoustic.  These are augmented by energy 
harvesting technologies (for example thermoelectric generators), and energy storage, particularly in the 
case of a wireless sensor network, however, the focus of this paper is wireless data communication based 
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on electromagnetic wave technology.  The aforementioned wireless technologies themselves are not 
novel at the time of writing, however, their application in a control system to provide safety critical 
functions is. 
 
3. Wireless Technology Challenges 
There are several safety and cyber security focussed challenges when considering the implementation 
of wireless technology, these can be summarised as [7]:  Eavesdropping, data availability (interference, 
jamming), data reliability, elevation of privilege (unauthorised access to system though exploitation of 
design flaw), and safety (predicable communication behaviour).  These problems are compounded by a 
cultural issue whereby designers and independent regulators alike typically raise concerns against a 
technology which is not yet well understood by the mainstream.  Education is the proposed solution to 
the cultural problem.  The former challenges are not unique to wireless technologies; such challenges 
should be considered irrespective of what data communication is employed for a given system.  A robust 
design process is required to assess the credibility of wireless technology implementation and mitigate 
any safety and security hazards which may be present. 
 
4. Proposed Risk Assessment Framework 
There is at present limited guidance which supports the consideration of wireless technology in industrial 
safety applications [8-10], the available guidance provides no clear strategy or process to be followed 
to substantiate the use of wireless technologies in a safety system.  It is proposed that system modelling 
and appropriate design assessments can resolve the credibility for wireless data communications for a 
given safety function.  The relationship between safety and security is complex and can only be managed 
through suitable design practices, such as model based systems engineering and cyber security threat 
modelling.  The proposed safety and security assessment framework is founded on a basic two-tiered 
approach; the first, and most important, is based upon processes and modelling mitigations, the second 
is based on design and technology mitigations. 
4.1. Design Process and Modelling Risk Mitigation 
A safety and security risk assessment process and framework should be developed.  This should be 
‘model based’, enabling the assessing of risks associated with each security and safety concern, 
supported by employing traditional Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) assessments, to understand the 
likely impact to a given system.  The process will allow for system design, safety and security features 
to be identified which will eliminate or mitigate the risks identified.  It may be possible to develop a 
more robust system-wide architecture to mitigate or remove the hazard in the first instance.  For a given 
use-case, if the risk cannot be reduced to an acceptable level, then wireless technology will not be 
appropriate for use. 
 Due to its maturity, the proposed assessment process is based on the NIST generic risk model 
[11].  The risk assessment shall:  Identify threat sources, events and vulnerabilities, determine their 
likelihood of occurrence, determine the magnitude of their impact, and determine their associated risk.  
Risk is a function of Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence whereby the most complex attribute is 
Threat because it can be intentional, unintentional, natural or human initiated [12].  Attributes associated 
with human initiated threats are: Capability; the resources available to an attacker, Intent; the motive 
behind an attack and associated difficulty for a defence to impact against, and Opportunity; the 
conditions required in order for an attack to be successful.  Risk is defined in equation (1): 
 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦)  ∙ 𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∙  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒  (1) 
 The NIST guide [11] provides a taxonomy of definitions for threat sources; threat actors, threat 
types, vulnerability groups, and system access points.  The most appropriate vulnerability group for this 
process is ‘Communication and Network’, which can be aligned to the Open Systems Interconnection 
(OSI) basic reference model [13].  Vulnerabilities associated with each OSI layer can then be identified, 
this could be done in accordance with the SANS Institute application [14].  The risk model is augmented 
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by an information security model; the three basic security concepts important to information security 
are: Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability.  The risk assessment framework is proposed in Figure 1, 
the overall process is outlined in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 1. Proposed Safety and Security Risk Assessment Framework 
 
 
Figure 2. Safety and Security Threat Analysis Process 
 
 Where wireless communication may be found to be credible for use in a given safety function, 
modelling is to be used to demonstrate the propagation of the wireless signal path within its intended 
environment, quantifying a signal-to-noise ratio, providing the ability to eliminate or mitigate the effects 
of eavesdropping, interference, and to optimise the physical location of any wireless nodes within the 
system.  From the model data, the credibility of signal jamming can also be assessed.  Modelling of the 
protocol is then required to provide evidence as to the behaviour of the protocol, ensuring predictability 
in data packet handling, timing, and error management (data integrity and reliability).  This design work 
should consider what network topology and protocols are to be used, and what standards they are to be 
assessed against.  Prior to prototypic hardware development, measurements are to be taken in a 
representative environment to validate the model.  Furthermore, identification of system operational 
policies and access controls will improve safety and security resilience for the intended system, but this 
should not be relied upon alone. 
4.2. Product Design and Technology Risk Mitigation 
Further risk mitigations are available during the product design stage; this should be underpinned by 
prototypic testing in a relevant environment with independent security assurance testing. The 
obfuscation of messages is a simple way to mitigate the effects of eavesdropping, data encryption further 
mitigates this risk, enhancing data integrity and confidentiality.  Designing a receiver system to employ 
finite time listing periods will mitigate any external attempts of system overloading.  Consideration of 
network scheduling and data synchronisation is required, as this potentially introduces the risk of 
common cause failure onto the network should the timing of the data within the network fall out of 
synchronisation.  Employing unique message identifiers, which may be based upon a time stamp or an 
incremental transaction counter mitigates susceptibility to system overloading.  Diverse signal 
propagation can be employed, using different carrier frequencies and protocols to mitigate common 
mode failure mechanisms.  Indeed, it is considered that wireless technology can augment wired systems 
for safety critical functions to provide improved resilience to system safety and security hazards.  
Application of Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) solutions are recommended to support a proven-in-
use argument; COTS solutions are subjected to a larger sample set of observations, thus providing more 
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accurate predictions on fault-free behaviour, safety and security robustness. It is often the case that the 
physical platform or environment can be used or modified to prevent data access outside of the system 
boundary.  Finally, data encryption alone is not sufficient for system security or system safety. 
 
5. Conclusions 
It is considered that the introduction of wireless technology will not eliminate the need for wired 
functions for an industrial control system, this is particularly true for safety systems.  Diligence is 
required to understand where wireless technologies can be adopted for safe and secure functionality.  
This approach should be no different to the consideration of safety functions deployed on wired 
solutions, and therefore, system safety and security robustness can be demonstrated via a robust design 
process.  A simple yet robust design process for the consideration of wireless technology for use within 
a safety system has been presented.  To date, the risk assessment process and associated electromagnetic 
modelling has been validated in a laboratory environment, supported by measurements in a relevant 
environment.  Safety and security should be considered for ‘IoT and ‘Industry 4.0’ applications.   
Connecting systems, including safety critical systems, to wider networks such as the internet is often 
cited in support of new technology trends such as ‘big data’ and Equipment Health Management (EHM).  
However, it is clear that this is a system level security risk and an indirect safety risk; one that needs to 
be addressed and very well managed as it may impact product safety and commercial credibility. 
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